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ACT: THE CHALLENGE OF MUDDLING THROUGH
John T. Nakahata*
As we approach the 70th anniversary of the
Communications Act of 1934 ("the Act" or "the
Communications Act"),' this familiar grand dame
is afflicted with a terminal condition-Internet
Protocol ("IP"). This condition is not one of sud-
den onset, and is reallyjust the late stage manifes-
tation of its precursor, digitalization. Broad-
band-and IP-based services more generally-at-
tack the fundamental skeleton of the Communi-
cations Act itself, eroding the framework around
which the Act's regulations are built. Although
legislative surgery has saved our grand dame
before by adding the cable provisions of Title VI
("the 1984 Act") 2 and the local competition provi-
sions of Title II ("the 1996 Act"), 3 the cure for
broadband IP is a long way off-and may not even
be effective without killing the patient and replac-
ing her with something entirely new.
The difficulty facing the Federal Communica-
tions Commission ("FCC"), of course, is that the
FCC itself is a creature of the Act. The Communi-
cations Act created the Commission, 4 established
its powers and set limits on the Commission's au-
thority.5 The Commission is not the Congress-it
cannot enact new laws outside of the Act's delega-
tions of rulemaking authority. And the Commu-
nications Act will not simply expire to be suc-
ceeded by the next generation.
If the technological assumptions underlying the
Act's core statutory framework are indeed collaps-
ing, then the challenge for the Commission is
how to muddle through to best achieve sound
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1 47 U.S.C. §§160-714 (2000). References to the Act in-
clude all amendments thereto, except as specifically noted.
public policy-and some degree of regulatory cer-
tainty-in a statutory environment that will be
fraught with artificial, legacy statutory distinc-
tions. The Commission has floated the idea of us-
ing its ancillary jurisdiction under Title I to fash-
ion a new regulatory regime for broadband ser-
vices. But this approach, if adopted by the Com-
mission, is sure to be tested in the courts. So, the
Commission (and the courts and industry) will
end up confronting at least three questions: (1)
how should the Commission best muddle through
to address broadband IP services in the absence of
new legislation; (2) does the Commission really
have authority to create a new affirmative regula-
tory framework; and (3) what happens if the Com-
mission is wrong about the scope of its authority
given the existing statutory framework.
To help frame these issues further, this article
first delineates what is generally meant by "broad-
band;" discusses some of the ways in which broad-
band services challenge the technological assump-
tions underlying the Act's core statutory classifica-
tions; contrasts the legal underpinnings of the
Commission's articulated Title I approach to
broadband with the "telecommunications ser-
vices" approach adopted by the Ninth Circuit; and
reviews two examples of policy issues embedded
in this debate.
I. WHAT IS BROADBAND?
For clarity of discussion, we need to have a com-
2 Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 47 U.S.C.
§§522-73 (2000).
3 47 U.S.C. §§251-76 (2000), which were added to the Act
by the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104,
110 Stat. 153 (1996).
4 47 U.S.C. §151 (2000).
5 See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. §§154-55 (2000) (authorizing the
number of commissioners, their qualifications, their duties,
and overall organization).
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mon working understanding of what we are talk-
ing about when we refer to "broadband." The
FCC itself has not defined this term. 6 In its Wire-
line Broadband Internet Access NPRM,7 the FCC ap-
pears to be referring to services, such as Digital
Subscriber Lines ("DSL") and cable modem ser-
vices, that have at least the following characteris-
tics: they are offerings of last-mile IP transmission
capability; that transmission capability is not
switched, but is "always on;" and they combine
with the IP transmission capability other functions
that enable the customer to access and use the In-
ternet to retrieve information and communicate
with others, whether that communication is re-
produced as voice or data. These services today
are generally sold on a flat-rate basis, and tiered
for maximum transmission capacity. The FCC has
not distinguished "broadband" from traditional
high capacity telecommunications services that a
business user might purchase in conjunction with
Internet access, such as ISDN-PRI or T-1, which
have generally not been considered "broadband"
within the terms of current FCC policy debates.
Notably, this "definition" of broadband is based
on an end user service application, Internet ac-
cess, rather than purely a functional description.
That is, it combines physical transmission in IP
format with the application-a service with the
ability to send, retrieve and manipulate informa-
tion available over the Internet. As will be elabo-
rated in Section II, the FCC has been confronting
the question of how this "definition" of broad-
band fits into the general framework of the Com-
munications Act, which defines services and
places them in a regulatory "pigeonhole" accord-
ing to the end user application.
6 Initially, the FCC eschewed use of the term "broad-
band" in favor of "advanced telecommunications," the term
found in Section 706 of the 1996 Act, 47 U.S.C. §§251-76. See
In re Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Tele-
communications Capability to All Americans in a Reasonable
and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to Accelerate Such
Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecommunica-
tions Act of 1996, Third Report, 17 FCC Rcd. 2844, para. 9
(2002). The FCC more recently has begun to use the term
broadband. See, e.g., In re Appropriate Framework for Broad-
band Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities, Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 17 FCC Rcd. 3019, 3021 (2002) [herein-
after Wireline Broadband Internet Access NPRM]. In that
NPRM, however, the Commission also failed to advance a
definition of "broadband," and it recognized that "broad-
band" and "broadband services . . .are elusive concepts, as
they have come to mean many different things to many dif-
ferent people." Id. at n.2.
7 Wireline Broadband Internet Access NPRM, supra note
It is also useful analytically to separate the trans-
mission function from the Internet access applica-
tion provided over that transmission facility. The
question of whether and how to regulate broad-
band then splits into two sets of issues: (1) do you
regulate the high capacity, always-on last-mile IP
transmission service, and if so, how do you do so
and whom do you regulate; and (2) do you regu-
late the retail application that allows a user to
transmit and receive information (including pack-
etized voice transmissions) from different points
on the Internet or other IP networks, or to distant
points interconnected with the end user's IP net-
works, and if so, how do you do so and whom do
you regulate.
II. BROADBAND AND THE EROSION OF
THE ACT'S CURRENT REGULATORY
FRAMEWORK
The current framework of the Communications
Act is regulation by "pigeonhole," or as other
commenters have called it, silo regulation. 8 The
hallmark of this framework is that each service is
classified as common carriage (also labeled "tele-
communications services"), private carriage, infor-
mation (also labeled "enhanced") services, Com-
mercial Mobile Radio Service ("CMRS"), cable
services, or broadcasting. The pigeonholes are
largely technology specific, and contemplate spe-
cific applications and business models. CMRS, for
example, is statutorily defined as a for-profit radio
service, with equipment that is capable of being
moved.9 Common carriage requires a transmis-
6.
8 See John T. Nakahata, Regulating Information Platforms:
The Challenge of Rewriting Communications Regulation from the
Bottom Up, I J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH L. 95, 100 (2002)
[hereinafter Nakahata]; Douglas C. Sicker, Further Defining a
Layered Model for Telecommunications Policy, 4, available at
http://tprc.org/papers/2002/95/LayeredTelecomPolicy.
pdf (Oct. 3, 2002) [hereinafter Sicker]; Richard S. Whitt, A
Horizontal Leap Forward: Formulating A New Public Policy Frame-
work Based on the Network Layers Model, 2-3 (2003) (unpub-
lished MCI Public Policy Paper) (on file with author) [here-
inafter Whitt]. Kevin Werbach has called the current system
"horizontal" regulation, making the same point. Kevin
Werbach, A Layered Model for Internet Policy, 1 J. TELECOMM. &
HIGH TECH L. 37, 39-40 (2002) [hereinafter Werbach].
9 47 U.S.C. §§332(d)(1), 153(27), 153(28) (2000) (defin-
ing commercial mobile service and specifying for profit, de-
fining "mobile service" and specifying a "radio communica-
tion service," and defining "mobile station," specifying that
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sion by wire or radio."' A cable system requires
the one-way transmission of video programming
over a system that has "closed transmission paths
and associated signal generation, reception and
control equipment."'' Broadcasting is specifically
defined as the dissemination of "radio communi-
cations intended to be received by the public, di-
rectly or by the intermediary of relay stations."'12
Each pigeonhole has its own regulatory scheme
and set of institutional arrangements. Common
carriers, for example, are regulated by the FCC
and state public utility commissions. 13 Private car-
riers are largely free of regulation, with some ex-
ceptions, but also lack some of the significant
rights of common carriers. 14 Information service
providers have been covered by the FCC's Title I
jurisdiction, and again are largely free of the regu-
latory requirements placed on common carriers,
as well as many of the rights. 15 CMRS providers
are licensed by the FCC, and can be subjected to
certain types of state regulation, but not regula-
tion of rates or entry. 16 Broadcasters are licensed
under Title III of the Communications Act and
subject to extensive federal regulation, but gener-
ally not state regulation. 17 Cable operators are
franchised at the local or state level, and are sub-
ject to regulation by franchising authorities, as
well as by the FCC under Title VI of the Commu-
nications Act. 18
Thus, under the Communications Act it be-
comes a critical regulatory exercise to determine
the "classification" of any new service, for exam-
ple, the regulatory pigeonhole to which the ser-
vice is assigned. These debates become long and
protracted legal battles. The classification carries
with it a bundle of rights and responsibilities, not
only for the new service offeror, its competitors
and consumers, but also for different local, state
and federal governmental entities. Service provid-
ers seek for themselves the most favorable classifi-
radio communications equipment must be "capable of being
moved and which ordinarily does move," respectively).
10 47 U.S.C. §153(10) (2000).
11 47 U.S.C. §522(7) (2000).
12 47 U.S.C. §153(6) (2000).
13 Nakahata, supra note 8, at 104.
14 Id. at 106-07.
15 Id. at 108-10.
16 47 U.S.C. §332 (2000); see Nakahata, supra note 8, at
110-11.
17 47 U.S.C. §§301-339 (2000).
18 47 U.S.C. §§521-549 (2000). See Nakahata, supra note
8, at 111-13.
cation with the fewest regulatory restrictions-or
at least the regulatory restrictions that are easiest
for them to accommodate-and the most oner-
ous classification for their competitors. Govern-
mental entities with jurisdiction over a part of a
provider's service almost never want to yield juris-
diction over that same provider's new service, and
therefore seek the classification that maximizes
their own authority.
The debate over the proper regulatory classifi-
cation of wireline broadband Internet access ser-
vices-both cable-based and traditional common
carrier-based-illustrates the importance of regu-
latory classification and some of the stakes in-
volved. Cable modem services were developed by
cable operators, which historically had not been
treated as common carriers. Cable modem ser-
vice, therefore, developed as a unified consumer
offering of a combination of high-speed data
transmission and the Internet access application.
Moreover, it was a proprietary offering, and high-
speed transmission generally was not offered sepa-
rately on a wholesale basis to entities other than
the cable operator's ISP partner. 19 Local franchis-
ing authorities, which have always played a central
role in regulating cable television, quickly as-
serted the right to receive a share of cable modem
revenues as part of their statutorily-permitted
franchise fee. 20
When offered by entities that historically had
been common carriers, however, high-speed
broadband Internet access service, and the under-
lying transmission facilities, evolved in a different
regulatory environment. Under the FCC's long-
standing Computer H rules, when a facilities-based
common carrier offers an information service, it
must also make the underlying basic telecommu-
nications service available to other information
service providers. 2 1 The Computer II separate offer-
ing requirement was developed expressly to sepa-
19 Cable has been subject only to very limited, statutorily-
delineated mandatory carriage requirements. See 47 U.S.C.
§§531, 532, 534, 535 (2000) (dealing with PEG access, leased
access, commercial broadcast "must-carry," and non-commer-
cial broadcast "must-carry," respectively). See also FCC v. Mid-
west Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 691-694 (1979) (overturning
pre-1984 Act mandatory access rules).
20 47 U.S.C. §542 (2000).
21 Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's
Rules and Regulations (Second Computer Inquiry), Final De-
cision, 77 F.C.C. 2d. 384, 475 (1980) [hereinafter Computer
II].
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rate market power in the underlying facilities
from the ability to provide an information service.
As the Commission explained:
Because enhanced services are dependent upon the
common carrier offering of basic services, a basic ser-
vide is the building block upon which enhanced ser-
vices are offered. Thus those carriers that own common
carrier transmission facilities and provide enhanced
services, but are not subject to the separate subsidiary
requirement, must acquire transmission capacity pursu-
ant to the same prices, terms, and conditions reflected
in their tariffs when their own facilities are utilized.
Other offerors of enhanced services would likewise be
able to use such a carrier's facilities under the same
terms and conditions.
22
Accordingly, when Incumbent Local Exchange
Carriers ("ILECs") introduced their own DSL-
based information services, they were required to
make standalone offerings of DSL transmission
capacity as a common carrier service. 23 Internet
Service Providers ("ISPs") competing with the
ILEC were then able to purchase DSL transmis-
sion services from the ILEC, and combine it with
their own Internet applications and services in or-
der to offer their own Internet access product to
end users.24
The differences in regulatory treatment of the
parent led to additional regulatory disparities.
For example, because cable modem services have
not been considered "telecommunications ser-
vices"-at least prior to the Brand X decision 25-
cable modem transmission has not been subject
to universal service assessments, nor has it been
subject to the requirements of the Communica-
tions Assistance to Law Enforcement Act
("CALEA").26 In contrast, DSL transmission ser-
vices are subject to federal universal service assess-
ments and to CALEA.
22 Id. at 475. This obligation today still applies even to
facilities-based non-dominant common carriers that compete
with several other carriers along the same routes, and thus
lack market power.
23 See In re Deployment of Wireline Servs. Offering Ad-
vanced Telecomm. Capability, Various Petitions, Memoran-
dum Opinion and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 13
FCC Rcd. 24012, 24028-30 (1998) (finding that advanced ser-
vices, such as DSL, are "telecommunications services" when
offered to the public directly or on a stand-alone basis).
24 Initially, the Commission also required ILECs to un-
bundle the high frequency portion of the loop, also known as
"line sharing." See generally In re Deployment of Wireline
Servs. Offering Advanced Telecomm. Capability and Imple-
mentation of the Local Competition Provisions of the
Telecomm. Act of 1996, Third Report and Order and Fourth Re-
port and Order, 14 FCC Rcd. 20912 (1999), rev'd and remanded
sub. nom., U.S. Telecom. Ass'n v. FCC, 290 F.3d 415 (D.C. Cir.
2002). The Commission has now determined that such com-
A second example of a regulatory classification
battle affecting broadband is Voice-over-Internet
Protocol ("VolP"). Specifically, consider the fol-
lowing example: Vonage Holdings Corp.
("Vonage") provides a service in which it allows its
subscribers to use the broadband connection the
subscriber purchases from a cable operator or
DSL-provider to place voice calls to and receive
voice calls from the Public Switched Telephone
Network ("PSTN").27 The Minnesota Public Utili-
ties Commission ("Minnesota PUC") reviewed
Vonage's offering, and, notwithstanding the fact
that Vonage reached its customer over that cus-
tomer's broadband Internet access facilities and
connected to the PSTN via a competitive local ex-
change carrier, the Minnesota PUC concluded
that Vonage was offering telephone service as de-
fined by Minnesota law.28 Vonage filed a petition
for declaratory ruling at the FCC seeking a decla-
ration that Vonage's service is an interstate "infor-
mation service," and thus beyond state commis-
sion jurisdiction. 29 Again, as a direct result of the
Communications Act's structure, the Commis-
sion's classification decision will not only affect
the regulatory burden on Vonage, but also rights
of third parties and the institutional power of
state and local governments.
These classification battles develop because, as
high tech commentator (and former FCC staffer)
Kevin Werbach observed, regulation by pigeon-
hole "presumes that regulators can assign every
service to a specific category."30 Werbach noted,
"In the era of analog networks, this model was rel-
atively easy to implement, as each service had dis-
crete physical plant and outputs. For example,
peting carriers are not impaired without access to that por-
tion of the loop, and thus is phasing out "line sharing." See
generally In re Review of the Section 251 Unbundling Obliga-
tions of Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers, Report and Order
and Order on Remand and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
18 FCC Rcd. 19020 (2003).
25 Brand X Internet Servs. v. FCC, 345 F.3d 1120, 1132
(9th Cir. 2003).
26 47 U.S.C. §§1001-1021 (2000).
27 See Vonage, How It Works, at http://www.vonage-pro
motion.com/product howitworks.php (last visited Aug. 21,
2004).
28 Vonage Holdings Corp. v. Minn. Pub. Utils. Comm'n,
290 F. Supp. 2d 993, 995-996 (D. Minn. 2003).
29 Id. at 1003 (explaining that Vonage also filed suit in
federal district court to enjoin the Minnesota PUC's decision
on the same grounds. The court agreed with Vonage and
enjoined the Minnesota PUC from enforcing its decision).
30 Werbach, supra note 8, at 40.
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telephone networks carried voice, while over-the-
air television networks carried broadcast video."3 1
The challenge that broadband-and IP technolo-
gies more generally-pose is that they test this as-
sumption that "the Internet is going to swallow
telecommunications." 32 In short, it is all becom-
ing data.3 3
As Werbach explains, this is inevitable from the
concept of the Internet (and Internet Protocol)
itself:
Its designers set out not to deliver content, but to inter-
connect networks (hence the name Inter-net). Neither
services offered nor physical infrastructure nor geo-
graphic location determine whether something is part
of the Internet .... The developers of IP deliberately
made it a lowest common denominator, so that a ser-
vice such as the World Wide Web can run over every-
thing from Sun workstations on corporate networks to
smart mobile phone handsets to television sets using
digital cable set-top boxes.
3 4
By its design, therefore, the Internet-and IP-
run directly counter to two sets of assumptions
underlying the pigeonhole-based framework of
the Communications Act. First, IP breaks the link
between the delivery technology and the service
application. VoIP is just that-and not voice over
twisted pair, voice over hybrid fiber coax or voice
over wireless device. It could be all three. Sec-
ond, IP also breaks underlying assumptions about
industry structure. In an IP era, it cannot simply
be asserted that voice service-or the underlying
ILEC twisted pair wire-is a monopoly (or has
market power). What is required to make this de-
termination is a rigorous, market analysis of the
kind used by federal antitrust authorities. 35 Broad-
band may be a monopoly, but on the other hand,
it may not. In many residential areas, it is appar-
ent that broadband is already offered in at least a
duopoly structure of competing DSL and cable
modem services.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 45.
33 See Kevin Werbach, Voice in a Digital Broadband
World, 4, at http://www.werbach.com/docs/FCC-_VOIP.ppt
(Dec. 1, 2003) (providing the text of Werbach's slide presen-
tation at the FCC VoIP Forum).
34 Werbach, supra note 8, at 47.
35 See Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commis-
sion Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552
(1992), revised, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) para. 13,104 (Apr.
8,1997).
36 See Werbach, supra note 8, at 58-64 (describing a
layered model for analyzing telecommunications and In-
ternet regulation); Douglas Sicker andJoshua Mindel, Refine-
ments of a Layered Model for Telecommunications Policy, I J.
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH L. 69, 86-88 (2002) [hereinafter
The inherent flexibility of IP-based transmis-
sion to deliver multiple services has led several
commentators to call for what has come to be
called a "layered" approach to analysis of regula-
tion. 36 Although different commentators have
used varying numbers of layers, one of the most
common is a four-layered model of content, appli-
cation, code/logic, and physical . 7 These com-
mentators advocate analyzing and developing reg-
ulation as appropriate in order to address com-
petitive and other public policy issues at or be-
tween each layer, rather than applying regulation
to a service as delivered by a particular technol-
ogy.38 The layers approach is meant to cut across
the traditional boundaries of service and technol-
ogy. As one commentator argues, the layered
model approach:
removes the assumption that service boundaries are
clear and are tied to physical network boundaries; im-
plies a more granular analysis within each layer; brings
to the forefront the issue of interconnection between
networks, and between functional layers within those
networks; and recognizes the significance of network
architecture as a determining factor in shaping busi-
ness dynamics.
39
However, the difficulty with immediately imple-
menting a layered approach-whatever its
merit-is that the Communications Act itself is
not layered. Instead, as has been discussed, it is
comprised of service and technology-based silos.
With no imminent statutory reform, the Commis-
sion itself faces difficult choices. One alternative
is to fashion a new regulatory scheme out of the
Commission's Title I authority-the approach
suggested by Chairman Michael K. Powell, in the
Commission's Wireline Broadband Internet Access
NPRM and Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling.40 An-
other alternative is to begin with the Commis-
sion's Title II authority and pare back these obli-
Sicker/Mindel]; Sicker, supra note 8, at 9-13; and Whitt,
supra note 8, at 23-26.
37 See Werbach, supra note 8, at 59-60; Whitt, supra note
8, at 26 (subdividing further the physical network layer into
access and transport). Sicker/Mindel suggest four layers of
content, applications, transport and access. Sicker/Mindel,
supra note 36, at 88-89.
38 See Werbach, supra note 8, at 54; Sicker, supra note 8,
at 6-9; Whitt, supra note 8, at 18-23.
"'9 Whitt, supra note 8, at 20, citing Werbach, supra note
8.
40 See In re Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the
Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities, Declaratory Ruling
and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 FCC Rcd. 4798 (2002)
[hereinafter Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling], affd in part
and revd in part sub nom., Brand X Internet Servs. v. FCC, 345
2004]
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gations-the approach implicated by the Ninth
Circuit's recent Brand X decision.4 1
III. TITLE I VERSUS BRAND X
A. The FCC's Title I Approach
In its Wireline Broadband Internet Access NPRM42
and Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling,43 the FCC
started down the path of declaring that broad-
band services, including broadband transmission,
fall within the Act's "information services" pigeon-
hole. Chairman Powell has explained that his ap-
proach to Internet services is to start with "the cle-
anest slate possible"44 and "build from a blank
slate up as opposed to from the myriad of tele-
communications regulations down." 45 This ap-
proach attempts to combat the problems created
by the Act's other regulatory categories by using
the information services category to create a more
appropriate regulatory structure for broadband
services. 46
There are a couple of notable features of this
approach. First, this approach considers the
product sold to the consumer as an integrated of-
fering to the public, not a bundle of two separate
products-an information service and a telecom-
munications service. 47 The FCC adopted this posi-
tion notwithstanding the fact that the cable opera-
tor-and the ILEC DSL provider-is providing its
broadband customer both with the underlying
broadband transmission as well as computer
processing and access to databases. This is in con-
trast to dial-up Internet access in which the ISP
provides only the processing/access to databases,
F.3d 1120, 1132 (9th Cir. 2003).
41 Id.
42 Wireline Broadband Internet Access NPRM, supra
note 6.
43 Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling, supra note 40.
44 Michael Feazel, Powell Says Internet Regulation Should
Start from Blank Slate, COMM. DAILY, Oct. 15, 2003, at 4 (citing
Michael K_ Powell, Address to the United States Telecommu-
nications Association (Oct. 14, 2003)).
45 Michael K. Powell, Remarks at the Meeting of the
Technology Advisory Council On Voice over IP (Oct. 20,
2003) at 2.
46 Another example of the approach of creating a new
classification within the Communications Act was the Clinton
Administration's proposal for a new Title VII for broadband
services. See generally THE WHITE HOUSE, ADMINISTRATION
WHITE PAPER ON COMMUNICATIONS Acr REFORMS 7, at http://
clinton6. nara.gov/1994/01 / 1994-01-25-white-paper-on-com
munications-act-reforms.html (Jan. 25, 1994).
47 See Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling, supra note 40, at
and the customer uses her telephone service for
transmission.
Second, although the approach is profoundly
deregulatory in nature, it is not necessarily en-
tirely deregulatory. In the Cable Modem Declaratory
Ruling, although the FCC concluded that cable
modem service was an information service, it then
issued a NPRM seeking comment, inter alia, on
whether it should impose a multiple ISP require-
ment on cable modem system operators. 4 In the
debates over VoIP, it is even clearer that the Com-
mission may seek not just to deregulate Title I in-
formation services, but also to impose affirmative
regulatory obligations-and perhaps even rights.
One of the core assumptions of the Title I ap-
proach appears to be that in broadband markets
that are often (but not always) at least a duopoly,
there is no longer a significant concern that a
transmission provider could use its control of ba-
sic transmission facilities to reduce competition in
the provision of enhanced, transmission facilities
that ride over those basic facilities-the competi-
tion policy basis for the Computer II rules. 49 To this
end, the Commission has sought comment on
whether it should eliminate the requirement that
facilities-based common carriers make available
basic transmission facilities that underlie their
own information services. 50 This assumption is
further discussed in Section IV(A).
A second assumption apparently being made by
the Commission is that it has the legal authority to
promulgate any regulations that it deems neces-
sary for Title I information services. In addition
to competition policy issues, Title I of the Com-
4823-24; Wireline Broadband Internet Access NPRM, supra
note 6, at 3028-31.
48 See Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling, supra note 40, at
4839.
49 See Wireline Broadband Internet Access NPRM, supra
note 6, at 3040.
Because the rules adopted in the Computer Inquiries were
based on assumptions shaped largely by certain service
and market characteristics prevalent at the time, we seek
comment on whether those assumptions, and the result-
ing rules, should be modified in the context of wireline
broadband Internet access to account for such changes.
For example, we seek comment on what significance we
should place on the extent to which broadband Internet
access services can be or are provided over a variety of
differentiated network platforms, such as cable, wireless,
and satellite.
Id.
50 Id. at 3042.
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munications Act implements a number of social
policies, including universal service, access for
persons with disabilities, compliance with the re-
quirements of CALEA, customer proprietary net-
work information, consumer protections for pay-
per-call services and protections against slam-
ming.5' It is unlikely that the Commission will
abandon these social/consumer protection objec-
tions for broadband services simply because it may
consider broadband-based services to be Title I in-
formation services, and it may even have lingering
competition-based concerns.
The assumption of affirmative regulatory power
under Title I begs for closer examination. It is
true that the FCC has previously asserted broad
jurisdiction to regulate interstate information ser-
vices, and has been upheld in doing. 52 It is also
true, however, that with respect to information
services, the Commission has rarely-and only re-
cently-sought to impose affirmative regulatory
obligations using its Title I authority.
53
The FCC previously attempted to fashion a reg-
ulatory scheme out of whole cloth using its Title I
authority when it adopted its pre-1984 cable regu-
lations. 54 On three different occasions, the U.S.
Supreme Court considered the question of the
Commission's authority to issue these regulations.
In the first case, U.S. v. Southwestern Cable Co.,55
the Supreme Court upheld an FCC enforcement
action against a cable operator that had extended
the carriage of a television signal outside its au-
thorized Grade B contour without prior FCC au-
thorization. 56 The Court ruled that Section 2(a)
of the Communications Act, which states that the
Act applies "to all interstate and foreign commu-
nications by wire or radio," was sufficient to give
51 See 47 U.S.C. §§222, 228, 229, 254, 255, 258 (2000)
(dealing with pay-per call services, CALEA, universal service,
access for persons with disabilities and anti-slamming, respec-
tively).
52 See Computer and Communications Indus. Ass'n v.
FCC, 693 F. 2d 198, 214-16 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Computer II,
supra note 21, at 432-33. The Commission was later reversed
to the extent that it attempted to assert jurisdiction over in-
trastate information services. See California v. FCC, 905 F.2d
1217, 123942 (9th Cir. 1990).
53 In the AOL-Time Warner merger, the FCC used its Ti-
tle I authority to justify imposing merger conditions regard-
ing Instant Messaging and Advanced IM-based high-speed
services. Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control
of Licenses and Section 214 Authorizations by Time Warner
Inc. and America Online, Inc., Transferors, to AOL Time
Warner Inc., Transferee, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 16
FCC Rcd. 6547, para. 148 (2001). The FCC has also used its
Title I jurisdiction to require that voicemail and interactive
the Commission jurisdiction over cable televi-
sion.57 The Court expressly rejected arguments
that Section 2 (a) "[did] not independently confer
regulatory authority upon the Commission, but
instead merely prescribe[d] the forms of commu-
nication to which the Act's other provisions may
separately be made applicable."58 The Court em-
phasized, however, "that the authority which we
recognize today under [§2(a) of the Communica-
tions Act] is restricted to that reasonably ancillary
to the effective performance of the Commission's
various responsibilities for the regulation of televi-
sion broadcasting."59
Four years later, the Supreme Court again con-
sidered the validity of an FCC rule governing
cable television. In that case, Midwest Video I, the
Court upheld an FCC rule that required cable sys-
tems of 3,500 or more subscribers that retransmit-
ted broadcast television stations to "operate [ ] to
a significant extent as a local outlet by cablecast-
ing and [to have] available facilities for local pro-
duction and presentation of programming." 60
The plurality upheld the rule as reasonably ancil-
lary to the Commission's broadcast regulation be-
cause it served the same broadcasting policies. 61
The plurality turned back objections that the local
programming mandated by the FCC would not be
transmitted over the broadcast spectrum, stating
that "[t]he effect of the regulation, after all, is to
assure that in the retransmission of broadcast sig-
nals viewers are provided suitably diversified pro-
gramming." 62 ChiefJustice Burger concurred sep-
arately, tipping judgment in favor of the FCC.
While Chief Justice Burger stated that "[c] andor
requires acknowledgement, for me at least, that
the Commission's position strains the outer limits
menu services be accessible to people with disabilities. See
Implementation of Sections 255 and 251(a)(2) of the Com-
munications Act of 1934, as Enacted by the Telecomm. Act of
1996, Report and Order and Further Notice of Inquiry, 16 FCC
Rcd. 6417 (1999). Neither of these assertions of Title I juris-
diction was tested on appeal.
54 Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 47 U.S.C.
§522-73 (2000) (enacted by Congress in 1984, it added Title
VI of the Communications Act).
55 U.S. v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
56 Id. at 160.
57 Id. at 167.
58 Id. at 171-72.
59 Id. at 178.
60 United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649,
653 (1972) (Justice Brennan writing for the plurality, joined
by Justices White, Marshall and Blackmun).
61 Id. at 669.
62 Id.
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of even the open-ended and pervasive jurisdiction
that has evolved by decisions of the Commission
and the courts," and that he was "not fully per-
suaded that the Commission has made the correct
decision in this case," he ultimately deferred to
the Commission's judgment in the absence of
congressional guidance. 63
Four justices (a number equal to those joining
the plurality) dissented vigorously, concluding
that the FCC had gone beyond the powers dele-
gated to it by the Congress. They concluded,
"Congress is the agency to make the decision and
Congress has not acted,"64 and "[t] here is not the
slightest clue in the Act that CATV carriers can be
compulsorily converted into broadcasters." 65 The
dissenters observed, "[t]he upshot of today's deci-
sion is to make the Commission's authority over
activities 'ancillary' to its responsibilities greater
than its authority over any broadcast licensee. '66
The last shoe dropped seven years later in Mid-
west Video I1.67 This time, the Court made clear
that Midwest Video I was the high-water mark for
the Commission's use of Title Ijurisdiction to cre-
ate affirmative regulations. Following Midwest
Video I, the Commission had adopted regulations
for cable systems with 3,500 or more subscribers
by setting a minimum capacity of twenty channels
and mandating that cable operators set aside four
channels for public, educational, governmental
and leased access. 68 The rules also governed the
cable system's permissible charges for such access.
On appeal, citing Midwest Video I, the Commission
argued that these rules promoted "long-estab-
lished regulatory goals of maximization of outlets
for local expression and diversification of pro-
gramming-the objectives promoted by the rule
sustained in Midwest Video [] ."69
In Midwest Video II, a majority of the Court 70
held that the FCC had gone too far. Latching on
to a portion of the Communications Act's defini-
tion of "common carriers" that excluded broad-
casters, the Court concluded that the FCC had im-
posed common carrier obligations on cable oper-
63 Id. at 676 (Burger, C.J., concurring in result).
64 Id. at 677 Uustice Douglas, dissenting, joined by Jus-
tices Stewart, Powell and Rehnquist).
65 Id. at 680.
66 Id. at 681.
67 FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979).
68 Id. at 691-94.
69 Id. at 699.
70 See id. (Writing for the majority, Justice White, who
had joined the Midwest Video I plurality, was joined by Chief
ators, which it viewed as inconsistent with the edi-
torial discretion given to broadcasters under the
Act.7 ' In Midwest Video II, the Court acknowledged
that it had relied on a restriction that did not ex-
plicitly limit cable regulation. 72 But it turned to
this provision of the Act in search of a limit on the
Commission's ancillary authority.73
If anything, recent experience shows an even
more skeptical view of the Commission's Title I
authority. When the FCC attempted to use its Ti-
tle I jurisdiction to require video description for
television programs, the D.C. Circuit Court of Ap-
peals struck down those rules as outside the Com-
mission's authority.74 Notwithstanding Midwest
Video l's origins in a rule mandating local content,
the Court of Appeals held that Title I could not
be a source ofjurisdiction where the rules "signifi-
cantly implicate program content."75
While not definitive, these cases show that a de-
gree of caution is warranted in assuming-in the
event the Commission relieves facilities-based
common carriers of Computer II requirements to
offer a separate, basic, common carrier transmis-
sion service-that the Commission has the au-
thority to "backfill" affirmative regulations on en-
tities that would now only be offering a Title I in-
formation service. Once broadband transmission
is taken out of the "telecommunications service"
pigeonhole, it may not be easy to impose new, af-
firmative obligations, even when the public inter-
est may be compelling.
B. Brand X and City of Portland
In contrast to the path apparently being
charted by the FCC, in two successive decisions,
the Ninth Circuit held that cable modem services
are not just information services, but are also
"telecommunications services," for example, the
offering of telecommunications to the public for a
fee. In the first case, AT&T v. City of Portland,76
the Ninth Circuit rejected Portland's attempt to
impose a multiple ISP carriage requirement on
Justice Burger and all of the Midwest Video I dissenters).
71 Id. at 699-706.
72 Id. at 706.
73 Id.
74 Motion Picture Ass'n of America, Inc. v. FCC, 309 F.3d
796 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
75 Id. at 799.
76 AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871 (9th Cir.
2000).
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AT&T Broadband as a condition of the transfer of
the Portland cable franchise from TCI to AT&T.
The Ninth Circuit's analysis began rather un-
remarkably by observing that cable modem ser-
vice "consists of two elements: a 'pipeline' (cable
broadband instead of telephone lines) and the In-
ternet service transmitted through that pipe-
line."'77 After observing that the cable modem ser-
vice provider "controls all of the transmission fa-
cilities between its subscribers and the Internet,"
the Ninth Circuit leapt to the conclusion that "to
the extent that [the cable modem service] pro-
vides its subscribers Internet transmission over its
cable broadband facility, it is providing a telecom-
munications service as defined by the Communi-
cations Act."78 On this basis, the Ninth Circuit
held that Portland's multiple ISP access condition
was an impermissible attempt to use the transfer
of a cable franchise to condition the provision of
a telecommunications service, and to require the
provision of a telecommunications service
through a cable franchise. 79
Three years later, the question of the proper
statutory classification of cable-provided broad-
band services was again before the Ninth Circuit
in Brand X v. FCC.s 0 In Brand X, even though the
FCC in the interim since the City of Portland deci-
sion, had ruled that cable-provided broadband
services were an offering of an information service
that used a private carriage telecommunication,
rather than an offering of a telecommunications
service, the Ninth Circuit nonetheless reversed.
As the concurring opinion made abundantly
clear, however, the Ninth Circuit was not render-
ing a judgment on the reasonableness of the
FCC's classification of cable-based broadband ser-
vices,' but was applying, under stare decisis, its
prior holding from City of Portland that the trans-
77 Id. at 878.
78 Id.
79 See id; see also 47 U.S.C. §541 (b) (3) (B) (2000) (prohib-
iting a franchising authority from "imposting] any require-
ment under [Title VI of the Communications Act] that has
the purpose or effect of prohibiting, limiting, restricting, or
conditioning the provision of a telecommunications service
by a cable operator or an affiliate thereof"); 47 U.S.C.
§541(b) (3) (D) (2000) (stating that "a franchise authority
may not require a cable operator to provide any telecommu-
nications service or facilities, other than institutional net-
works, as a condition of the initial grant of a franchise, a
franchise renewal, or a transfer of a franchise").
80 Brand X Internet Services v. FCC, 345 F.3d 1120 (9th
Cir. 2003).
81 Id. at 1132-34 (O'ScannlainJ., concurring).
mission component was a telecommunications
service.8 2
While neither Portland nor the per curium opin-
ion in Brand X shed any light on why the Ninth
Circuit initially concluded that cable modem
transmission was a "telecommunications service,"
Judge Thomas, who was a member of both the
Portland and Brand X panels, filed a lengthy con-
currence in Brand X that provides some insight.
Judge Thomas rejected the core assertion of the
FCC's cable modem declaratory ruling, that
"cable modem service is a single, integrated ser-
vice that enables the subscriber to utilize Internet
access service through a cable provider's facilities
and to realize the benefits of a comprehensive ser-
vice offering. '8 3 Drawing on Computer H and the
dial-up structure, Judge Thomas could not accept
the FCC's argument that by embedding transmis-
sion within an information service, a facilities pro-
vider could sell its service to the public without
being characterized as a telecommunications ser-
vice .84
If the Brand X decision stands-and it may
not-cable-based broadband likely would be clas-
sified as a telecommunications service. As such,
cable operators offering cable modem service
would be telecommunications carriers, subject to
all of Title II's regulatory requirements, including
the Computer II requirement that facilities-based
common carriers offer basic transmission services
separately from their information service, which
would mean that competitors could purchase the
transmission service. Whether or not tariffing ap-
plied to cable modem services would depend on
whether the FCC decided to classify cable opera-
tors as dominant carriers, or as non-dominant
providers.
These regulatory consequences under Title II
82 See Brand X, 345 F.3d at 1131.
83 Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling, supra note 40, at
4823. See also Brand X, 345 F.3d. at 1136 (Thomas, J., con-
curring).
84 Brand X, 345 F.3d at 1138-40 (Thomas,J., concurring)
("[S]omeone still has to provide telecommunications service,
even though the ISP's resale of this service to the public does
not transform the ISP into a telecommunications service pro-
vider. In the integrated cable modem context, the same
company provides these two, entirely separate services.").
Other commentators have found the FCC's reasoning hard
to swallow. See Rob Frieden, Adjusting the Horizontal and Verti-
cal in Telecommunications Regulation: A Comparison of the Tradi-
tional and a New Layered Approach, 55 FED. COMM. L. J. 207,
232-33 (2003) (calling the FCC's Title I approach "disingenu-
ous").
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would not necessarily be permanent. At the fed-
eral level, the FCC has the authority under Sec-
tion 10 of the Communications Act to forbear
from enforcement of any Title II requirements.8 5
However, in contrast to the Title I approach, in
which regulatory requirements would not exist
until added, under the Brand X classification, reg-
ulations exist until forborne. Moreover, unless
the Commission were to conclude that all broad-
band facilities and services provided over broad-
band are interstate, state regulatory requirements
with respect to any intrastate services would re-
main in place unless they violated Section 253's
ban on state barriers to entry.8 6
IV. BROADBAND SERVICES - DUOPOLY
AND INTERCONNECTION.
A. The Regulatory Implications of Stable
Duopoly
One of the more intriguing competition policy
issues that carries through the debate over broad-
band regulation is whether broadband-particu-
larly broadband transmission-is a stable duopoly
for residential and small business customers, and
if so, what is the proper regulatory prescription, if
any. Although DSL and cable modem are the cur-
rent marketplace broadband transmission tech-
nologies (with some satellite-based service), Dr.
Stagg Newman, the Chair of the FCC's Technol-
ogy Advisory Council's Broadband Working
Group, has listed nine other technology platforms
that "are capable now, or will be capable in the
near future, of delivering most of the services. '8 7
Although potential substitute technologies ex-
ist, their mere existence does not answer the ques-
tion of whether they will be viable enough in the
85 See generally 47 U.S.C. §160 (2000).
86 47 U.S.C. §253(a) (2000) (barring states and local gov-
ernments from enacting laws or regulations that "prohibit or
have the effect of prohibiting the ability of any entity from
providing any interstate or intrastate telecommunications
service").
87 OPTICAL WORKING GROUP, FCC TECHNICAL ADVISORY
COUNCIL, BROADBAND ACCESS PLAToRMS FOR THE MASS MAR-
KET: AN ASSESSMENT, 1, at http://www.fcc.gov/oet/tac/Broad
bandAccessSupportingMaterials 12 -402.pdf (Dec. 4,
2002). The nine enumerated technologies were Very High
Speed Digital Subscriber Lines (VDSL), Fiber to the Premise
(FTFP), Broadband Powerline Communications, Satellite,
Local Multi-point Distribution Systems (LMDS), Low GHz Li-
censed Wireless Systems (below 6 GHz), unlicensed wireless
systems (e.g. WiFi), Stratospheric Platforms and Third Gen-
eration Cellular Systems. Id. at 2.
marketplace to provide a disruptive force. Dr.
Newman concluded that "any new technology
platform will be quite challenged in most markets
to compete with the cable operators and incum-
bent telephone companies for the delivery of
high-speed Internet access either on a stand-alone
basis or in conjunction with other services."88
Even for terrestrial wireless using either licensed
spectrum below 5 GHz or unlicensed spectrum-
which he considered the best possibility for an al-
ternative to cable and DSL-he noted:
[S]ervice providers using these technologies will be
challenged to compete broadly for high speed Internet
access. Customer acquisition and service and other
non-technology costs are considerably greater than
technology costs. Therefore scale and the availability to
offer new service on an incremental basis to existing
services confer a distinct advantage to incumbents. 89
In the first instance, of course, the Commission
properly does not appear to be content to assume
the permanence of, or worse, enshrine a techno-
logical duopoly. Even if near to medium term
prospects are for duopoly, the Commission has
continued to make spectrum available and to take
other actions to enable new technological alterna-
tives to develop with lower costs. This path by the
Commission is apparent in its spectrum deci-
sions,90 as well as in its decision to open a Notice
of Inquiry into broadband over power lines.9 1
But if duopoly of the underlying broadband fa-
cilities is persistent for some significant, non-tran-
sitory period, is this a matter for concern warrant-
ing regulation? On the one hand, in the Commis-
sion's Echostar-Hughes Merger Order,9 2 the Commis-
sion raised significant concerns regarding a trans-
action that in many areas resulted in a merger to
duopoly for multi-channel video programming.93
On the other hand, the Commission has (prop-
88 Id. at 1.
89 Id.
90 In re Revision of Parts 2 and 15 of the Commission's
Rules to Permit Unlicensed National Information Infrastruc-
ture (U-NIl) devices in the 5 GHz band, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 18 FCC Rcd. 11581 (2003); Allocations and Ser-
vice Rules for the 71-76 GHz, 81-86 GHz and 92-95 GHz
Bands, 69 Fed. Reg. 3257 (Nov. 4, 2003) (to be codified at 47
C.F.R. pts. 1, 2, 15, 97 and 101).
91 In re Inquiry Regarding Carrier Current Systems, in-
cluding Broadband over Power Line Systems, Notice of Inquiy,
19 FCC Rcd. 8498 (2003).
92 In re Application of Echostar Communications Corpo-
ration, General Motors Corporation, and Hughes Electronics
Corporation, Hearing Designation Order, 17 FCC Rcd. 20559
(2002).
93 Id. at 20625. The Commission noted,
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erly) been reluctant to use its traditional rate reg-
ulation authority to police alleged coordinated in-
teractions among a small number of providers. 94
It is not at all clear whether rate regulation
through tariffing in a duopoly market would not
do more harm than good-with respect to con-
cerns of coordinated effects-because of the po-
tential for the tariff mechanism itself to facilitate
price coordination.
A core question would appear to be whether
one believes that the owners of the two predomi-
nant facilities-cable and the ILEC-can use
their ownership of broadband transmission facili-
ties to limit the applications and content that ride
over those facilities, and the devices that attach to
those facilities. The debate of whether Computer
II-type separate offering requirements should con-
tinue to be applied to ILEC DSL providers and
should be extended-in the form of a multiple
ISP requirement-to cable operators turns on this
question. As Werbach explained, this debate "can
thus be understood as a debate over whether
[broadband transmission] operators can use their
control of the physical layer ([broadband] distri-
bution plant) to restrict choice and competition
at the three higher levels [(logical, applications,
content)] ."9 5 Indeed, those who favor preserving
Computer II requirements for ILECs providing
DSL-based Internet access expressly make this ar-
gument.96
Some applications providers themselves have
Economists have identified several factors, which tend to
increase the possibility of collusion. Collusion appears
more likely, other things being equal, when: (1) there
are few firms in the market; (2) there are high barriers
to entry; (3) products are relatively homogeneous; (4)
contracts are for relatively short periods, and the prices
and terms are observable by other sellers; and (5) mar-
ket conditions are relatively stable," and then it con-
cluded, "basic economic principles and the characteris-
tics of the market suggest that the proposed merger may
increase the likelihood of collusion among [Multichan-
nel Video Programming Distributor] providers.
Id.
94 See In re Motion of AT&T Corp. to be Reclassified as a
Non-Dominant Carrier, Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 3271 (1995); In re
Policy and Rules Concerning the Interstate, Interexchange
Marketplace, Second Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 20730,
20750-53 (1996).
95 Werbach, supra note 8, at 66.
96 See Whitt, supra note 8, at 53 ("[T]he failure to appro-
priately regulate last-mile broadband facilities will allow those
providers to extend their market power into the higher lay-
ers, including applications and content; this form of vertical
integration would cause undue harm to the Internet.").
97 Wireline Broadband Internet Access NPRM, supra
raised concerns that broadband transmission
providers can control applications and content
running over their networks. In the FCC's Wire-
line Broadband Internet Access NPRA49 7 and Cable
Modem NPRM 8 rulemaking proceedings, a coali-
tion of software applications and equipment prov-
iders has asked the FCC to ensure that consumers
have a right to attach non-harmful customer
premises equipment to broadband networks, and
to preclude broadband transmission providers,
and their affiliated ISPs, from discriminating
against content or applications riding over those
facilities, subject to content/application neutral
limits on capacity.9 9 In general, cable and tele-
phone equipment regulation has placed strict lim-
its on cable operators' and telecommunications
carriers' ability to constrain the equipment that
can be attached to the network. 01 ' A Title I classi-
fication for broadband network facilities could,
however, put non-cable broadband facilities
outside of these requirements.
Moreover, the expressed concerns about trans-
mission layer operators impairing competing ap-
plications and content are not entirely hypotheti-
cal. With respect to analog television signals, for
example, the FCC was presented with a complaint
in which Gemstar claimed that Time Warner
Cable had been stripping information from the
vertical blanking interval that enabled use of
Gemstar's electronic programming guide. 10 1 In
that case, control of the physical layer was ex-
note 6.
98 Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling, supra note 40.
99 See Letter from Gerald Waldron to Marlene H. Dortch,
Secretary, FCC (Oct. 1, 2003) (filed in FCC CC Dockets No.
02-33, 98-10, 95-20 and GN Docket No. 00-185, on behalf of
the Coalition of Broadband Users and Innovators). The
members of the Coalition of Broadband Users and Innova-
tors are: American Electronic Ass'n, Alliance for Community
Media, Amazon.com, Inc., Apple Computer, Inc., Association
for Competitive Technology, Ass'n for Independent Video
and Filmmakers, Ass'n for Local Telecommunications Ser-
vices, Competitive Telecommunications Ass'n, Computing
Technology Industry Ass'n, Consumer Electronics Ass'n,
eBay Inc., Information Technology Ass'n of America, Media
Access Project, Microsoft Corp., National Ass'n of Manufac-
turers, Radio Shack Corp., The Walt Disney Co., Yahoo! Inc.
Letter from Coalition of Broadband Users and Innovators to
Chairman Michael K. Powell, Commissioner Kathleen Q Ab-
ernathy, Commissioner Michael J. Copps and Commissioner
Kevin Martin (Nov. 18, 2002) (filed in CC Dockets No. 02-33,
98-10 & 95-20, CS Docket No. 02-52 and GN Docket No. 00-
185).
100 47 U.S.C. §§544 (a), 549 (2000); 47 C.F.R. pt. 68
(2003).
101 See In re Gemstar Int'l Group, Ltd. and Gemstar Dev.
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tended to the application layer when the operator
of the physical layer filtered content. Those that
are seeking a "net neutrality" rule to be applied to
applications and content transmitted over broad-
band transmission facilities seek protection
against just this type of behavior by facilities-based
ISPs that may seek to advantage their own applica-
tions and content. 10 2 Again, if broadband trans-
mission is classified as a private telecommunica-
tions component of a Title I information service,
rather than as a telecommunications service, then
Section 202's protections against unjust or unrea-
sonable discrimination 103 would not be applica-
ble, and no non-discrimination requirement
would apply in the absence of a new, affirmative
Title I-based rule.
As it resolves issues of multiple ISP access on
cable systems, whether to continue the Computer H
separate offering requirements, and requests for
"net neutrality" rules, the Commission will have to
reach a judgment about the likely ability of duop-
oly technologies to leverage control of transmis-
sion facilities to affect competition in applications
and content. And, even if it does conclude that
there is the potential for such competitive harm,
the Commission also will have to make a judg-
ment regarding how long the transmission provid-
ers may continue to have such an ability, and
whether the benefits of addressing any potential
anticompetitive conduct outweigh the costs.
B. Interconnection and Network Effects
A second set of issues affecting broadband net-
works and services provided over those networks
Corp., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 16 FCC Rcd. 21531
(2001). Gemstar operated an electronic programming
guide. The Gemstar guides used information provided in
the vertical blanking interval of the television signal, which is
an area between picture images. Time Warner stripped the
Gemstar information from the broadcast television signal
into which it had been embedded by the broadcaster. When
Gemstar complained to the FCC, Time Warner argued that it
was not compelled to transmit this information under the
"must-carry" rules, and therefore had the ability to strip out
the information in the absence of a carriage agreement with
Gemstar. The FCC agreed with Time Warner. Id.
102 Letter from Gerald Waldron to Marlene H. Dortch,
supra note 99, at 11. As described in a recent ex parte, the
Coalition of Business Users and Innovators urges the Com-
mission to adopt "a simple safeguard to prohibit a broadband
service provider from, on a discriminatory or unreasonable
basis, interfering with or impairing subscribers' ability to use
their broadband service to access lawful Internet content or
services, use applications or services in connection with their
is interconnection requirements. This will be an
issue that needs to be addressed, particularly with
respect to VoIP services, which will in many in-
stances seek to interconnect with the Public
Switched Telephone Network ("PSTN"). And, it
could become a concern issue with respect to
broadband network providers themselves.
It is important to recognize that market power
from interconnection is not the same as market
power from control of limited underlying facili-
ties. As was reflected in the Department of Jus-
tice's and European Union's consideration of the
proposed Worldcom/Sprint and MCI/Worldcom
mergers, as well as the Department ofJustice's dis-
position of WorldCom's acquisition of In-
termedia, competition policy issues can be raised
when one network is, or threatens to become,
large enough that it has an incentive to deny in-
terconnection to other networks in order to drive
the other networks' subscribers to the larger net-
work.10 4 Significantly, the levels of market share at
which network "tipping" became a significant con-
cern to antitrust authorities was much lower than
current incumbent LEC market shares of tradi-
tional circuit switched lines.
Using VoIP as an example, these cases suggest
the possibility that an ILEC could have the incen-
tive and ability to deny interconnection to a VoIP
provider, absent regulation. By refusing intercon-
nection, the ILEC would not allow VoIP users to
reach, or be reached by callers on the PSTN,
thereby dramatically diminishing the value of
VoIP services. Alternatively, such interconnection
could be priced in a manner that could severely
limit the development of VoIP.
broadband service, or attach nonharmful devices to the net-
work." Id.
103 47 U.S.C. §202 (2000).
104 See Complaint of United States at 14-15, United States
v. WorldCom Inc. and Sprint Corp., Civil Action No. 1:00 CV
01526 (D.D.C., filed June 27, 2000) (alleging that a com-
bined 53% share of Internet traffic sent to or from customers
of the fifteen largest Internet backbones in the United States
would be anticompetitive); Commission Decision Declaring a
Concentration to be Compatible with the Common Market
and the Functioning of the EEA Agreement, 1999 O.J. (L
116) 1, at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/archive/2004/l_
09220040330en.html (last visited Aug. 21, 2004); Complaint
of United States at 11, United States v. WorldCom Inc. and
Intermedia Communications Inc., No. 1:00 CV 02789
(D.D.C. filed Nov. 17, 2000) (alleging that the combination
of the WorldCom and Intermedia backbones, which was less
than the proposed WorldCom/Sprint combination, could
have led to anticompetitive harms due to "tipping").
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Title II's interconnection requirements, as em-
bodied in Sections 251 and 252, however, only ap-
ply to "telecommunications carriers."'0 5 Thus, if
VoIP is an information service, the ILEC could ar-
gue that a VoIP provider is not entitled to inter-
connection under the Act. While VoIP providers
could then contract or affiliate with a Competitive
Local Exchange Carrier ("CLEC") to provide in-
terconnection services (in essence becoming a
customer of a CLEC so that the CLEC can use its
interconnection rights to connect the VoIP pro-
vider to the PSTN), there is little doubt that these
arrangements will also engender litigation and
confusion, particularly where the CLEC and VoIP
provider are affiliates. There may be no other al-
ternative, however, unless the Commission uses its
Title I authority to require ILECs to interconnect
with information service providers.
V. CONCLUSION
The rise of broadband, and IP services more
generally, creates real challenges in applying the
1934 Act's regulatory framework. It is a case of
round pegs and square holes. But until Congress
gets around to revising the Act, round pegs may
be the only alternative. In this environment, it
will be critical for the Commission to recognize
that once it embarks down a particular classifica-
tion, it may not be easy to turn back. The courts
will have a substantial role in affirming or revers-
ing classification choices, and also in reviewing
any attempts by the Commission to write new reg-
ulations under Title I. Where, as a policy matter,
the wisdom of selecting a Title I classification
turns upon the Commission's ability to write regu-
lations to address public interest regulations
under Title I, the Commission must consider the
public interest consequences should the courts re-
ject its jurisdiction to impose new regulations.
105 47 U.S.C. §§251, 252 (2000).
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